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ABSTRACT: Social policies are an essential instrument for fighting against women’s discrimination 
and overcoming gender inequality. However, an agreement about what gender equality consists of  
has not been achieved yet and, consequently, neither has a consensus been reached about what the 
suitable meanings (speaking in terms of  public policies) to reach that egalitarian paradigm. The 
main confrontation in this regard has been featured by the alternative positions held by the equality 
feminism and by the difference feminism. Based on the theoretical contributions developed by Nancy 
Fraser to try to overcome this dilemma, this paper aims to present some criteria that we consider 
key to the analysis of  a given system of  gender equality public policies when it comes to assessing 
its transformative-gender capacity, that is, the potential of  these measures to subvert the unequal 
gendered power relations that lie on the basis of  women’s subordination.
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1. Women and Welfare State
Welfare States emerged and developed in the Western World after the Second 
World War with the aim of  reversing – or, at least, of  lessening – the asymmetries 
and inequalities characteristic of  capitalism. Thus, the main objective of  state social 
provision systems that characterise Welfare States is to ensure the basic needs of  all 
citizens regardless of  their participation in the labour market, particularly when it 
was not possible to satisfy those needs through it, which resulted into a rupture or 
weakening of  the link between individuals and society, that is to say, of  the citizenship. 
This way, against the undermining of  citizenship, Welfare States are founded on the 
idea of  public responsibility for social provision of  basic goods and services that 
ensure the population a minimum level of  vital independence outside of  the market 
contingencies. 
However, originally, Welfare States did not face any other kind of  subjections 
beyond class inequalities. Therefore, the unequal balance of  power between men and 
women remained excluded from the public issues. It was not until the later seventies 
that this situation began to change. In this context, the progressive development of  the 
national governments towards increasingly interventionist regimes and the broadening 
of  the notion of  social justice beyond the boundaries of  redistributive justice are some 
factors that lead to the widespread acceptance of  the new role of  public powers as 
responsible for other structural inequalities beyond class, including gender inequality. 
Thus, from the 1970’s onwards, inequalities based on sex began to be addressed as a 
public issue that entails a proactive role from the governments to be solved through the 
articulation of  specific public policies. Accordingly, the role of  the State as guarantor 
of  the rights and autonomy of  individuals has been a decisive factor for women 
empowerment since their autonomy is much more likely to be compromised than 
men’s given that female’s life course is still marked by subordination and dependence 
on males as a result of  cultural stereotypes built around sexual dimorphism.
Once noted, the existence of  a hierarchical relationship between sexes assumed 
the idea that the structural nature of  the female subordination represents a matter of  
social justice, and recognized the fact that public powers have assumed and promoted 
this unequal gendered regime of  social relationships.1 It is inexcusable to demand the 
primary responsibility of  the States for the implementation of  the necessary measures 
be to eliminate this inequality of  power between men and women in the same way 
as, originally, Welfare States enforced their public policies to deal with economic 
inequalities derived from the capitalist system.
The influence of  the Welfare State on women’s social position directly affects its 
material situation in as much its role is crucial for shaping gender relationships toward 
gender equality, for structuring political conflict and for contributing to the formation 
and mobilisation of  specific identities and interests.2 Women are prominent recipients 
of  the benefits of  the Welfare State3 since social benefits compensate their deficient 
participation in the labour market either through monetary allowances or through a 
varied spectrum of  public services that ease the burden of  domestic unpaid work that 
women are usually responsible for.
1 Sara Martín Bardera, “Una mirada, distintas propuestas: género y políticas públicas”, Investigaciones 
Feministas, No. 7 (2016): 290. 
2 Ann Shola Orloff, “Gender and Social Right of  Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of  Gender 
Relations and Welfare States”, American Sociological Review, No. 58, vol. 3 (1993): 303-328.
3 Carole Pateman, “El Estado del bienestar patriarcal”, Contextos¸ No. 2 (2000): 1-29.
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However, it cannot be ignored that Welfare States are founded on the liberal 
democracies that had been constituted through the founding myth of  the social 
contract, in which women did not have access to civil citizenship or had access to 
it only partially, and that these regimes maintain this patriarchal structure of  the 
system to access civil and social rights through an exclusionary model of  citizenship 
that does not consider deserving subjects of  social and economic rights to people 
who do not contribute to the system with a share of  the earnings they made in the 
labour market. This way, Welfare States assume and promote the unequal balance 
of  power between genders that is the ultimate reason of  the female subordination 
in all the arenas. Following this idea, many feminist scholars have argued that great 
part of  the public policies implemented by Welfare State are indeed functionalist to 
the patriarchal system, since their implementation have sustained and nurtured the 
sexual division of  labour.4 From this perspective, the emergence of  modern social 
provision systems would imply nothing but the social reproduction of  the gender 
hierarchy5 through the transition from “private” to “public” patriarchy.6
Other scholars, such as Helga Hernes, may disagree with this perspective. The 
Norwegian political scientist coined the term “woman friendly policies” referring to those 
state programmes that contribute to the women’s empowerment and autonomy, 
redirecting the debate about whether or not overall Welfare States were functional 
to patriarchy but rather to the discussion about to what extent some specific public 
measures presented a real potential for the complete emancipation of  women as 
citizens and what public policies sustained and promoted male domination.7 Similarly, 
O’Connor8 pointed out that “(…) the assumption that aspects of  the welfare state as a 
whole are replicated in individual subsystems has the effect of  obscuring the historical specificity of  
particular arrangements and precludes the comparison of  any particular programme as more or less 
oppressive”. 
Following these thoughts, in this paper we will try to provide some criteria that 
can be used to analyse the potential of  the different public policies articulated by the 
States.
2. Gender equality policies
When it comes to articulating gender equality public policies, an essential issue 
is the definition of  the problem and the setting of  the objectives to be achieved, as 
well as the design of  strategies to achieve them.
4 It has also been pointed out from feminism that this strengthening of  the traditional system of  sexual 
division of  labour is no accidental. The Welfare State is possible precisely because women undertake the 
care burden for free and the system maintains a confidence that this will continue being that way. 
5 According the scholars that, along with Pateman, point to the patriarchal structure of  the Welfare State, 
the mechanism that the State performs to reproduce pre-existing gender hierarchy would be as follows: 
(1) The promotion of  the sexual division of  labour: care continues to be assigned – both, symbolically 
and in practice – to women while the traditionally male sectors of  the labour market are promoted. 
(2) The family wage system, which nurture female dependence on men. (3) The promotion from the 
morality of  the traditional marriage and traditional family. 
6 Ann Shola Orloff, “Gender in the Welfare State”, Annual Review of  Sociology No. 22, vol. 1 (1996): 
51-78. 
7 Helga Maria Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism (Oslo: Norwegian 
University Press, 1987).
8 Julia S. O’Connor, “From Women in the Welfare State to Gendering Welfare State Regimes”, Current 
Sociology, No. 44, vol. 2 (1996): 7.
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Public policies are institutionalised products of  a given political regime9 
that tend to be identified with the activity of  the executive power, decided and 
coordinated by the government and implemented by the different branches of  the 
public administration. Public policies’ main purpose is to respond to a demand 
that has been previously identified as a public issue in a specific social and political 
context determined by a particular system of  values.10 In general, public policies 
tend to be presented as unbiased measures, as beneficial for all the citizens without 
distinction of  any kind. Nevertheless, gender policies are a specific kind of  public 
policies that are implemented once it is widely assumed that, if  structural gender 
hierarchy that underpin patriarchal society is not taken into account, the outcome of  
the implementation of  these apparently neutral political policies tends to produce 
a diverse impact on men and women, reproducing gender hierarchy.11 This way, 
on the basis of  the conviction that puts the Nation State as primarily responsible 
for developing mechanism for the amelioration of  gender inequality and for the 
promotion of  the women’s empowerment, in the past few decades, a whole battery of  
regulations have been developed by the Nation States as well as by the International 
institutions at a Supranational level. These institutional instruments are articulated 
with the aim of  fighting against women’s discrimination, recognizing women’s rights 
and, eventually, overcoming the unequal situation for the sake of  a new model of  
parity and inclusive citizenship. However, the content of  the notion of  equality –
and therefore the content of  the policies that seek to achieve it – is not static but 
has changed or mutated over time. In this regard, as Helga Hernes has noted,12 a 
significant part of  the fight for equality would be nothing but precisely the fight for 
the redefinition of  the notion and the content of  gender equality.
Actually, beyond the quite widely accepted agreement about the public 
responsibility for the fight against sex inequalities, what has not been pacifically 
assumed is a consensus about what the content of  that inequality is. Therefore, 
neither exists an unified model of  equity to be reached by these public policies, 
which means that there is no consensus about what the objective to be pursued by 
the measures adopted by the public powers is, what aspects of  the social life they 
affect, and what are the more appropriate strategies to be implemented for this duty. 
Beyond its obvious practical implications, this is an issue with a strong symbolic 
significance since it is intimately linked to the debate about the definition of  female 
identity. Among feminists, the discussion about female identity is usually addressed 
from two positions presented as first, as opposed, and incompatible: equal feminism 
and difference feminism. Bringing this dichotomy to public policies arena, Carole 
Pateman13 named the debate after the intellectual pioneer Mary Wollstonecraft, 
author of  A Vindication of  the Rights of  Women, as the Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma. 
9 Sara Martín Bardera, Concepto de género: de las teorías feministas a las políticas públicas. La universidad pública 
española como estudio de caso (Doctoral Thesis, Universidad de Salamanca, 2016), 102.
10 Judith Astelarra, Veinte años de políticas de igualdad (Madrid: Cátedra Feminismos, 2005), 62.
11 María Pazos Morán, “Impacto de género de las políticas públicas”, Documentos Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales, No. 23 (2008).
12 Helga Maria Hernes, El poder de las mujeres y el Estado del bienestar (Madrid: Vindicación feminista, 
2003), 28.
13 Carole Pateman, “The Patriarchal Welfare State: Women and Democracy”, in Democracy and the 
Welfare State, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton: University Press, 1987).
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3. The Wollstonecraft’s dilemma
The feminism of  equality has its roots in women’s claims for rights beginning 
with the Enlightenment, and embraces as its main theoretical premise that there 
are no biological differences between sexes that justify the existence of  prescriptive 
difference social roles for men and women. For the advocates of  this approach, 
gender roles are just a cultural construction which comprises a gather of  behaviors 
and values compulsorily linked to each sex by society. From the theoretical 
framework of  the equal feminism, the only valid way to face sex inequality from 
the public institutions must be by conferring the same rights to men and women, 
ensuring equal treatment and opportunities and fighting against sex discrimination. 
This approach has generally led to a public managing of  sex inequality limited to 
enable the incorporation of  women into the public sphere without changing the 
rules, patterns and standards that performed this space at its origins as male arena. 
However, it emerged around the 1980’s that this approach to the subordination of  
women presented serious limitations to accomplish a real full citizenship for women. 
In fact, although the developing of  policies for the  recognition of  rights constitutes 
a necessary step in order to reach gender equality, this approach was soon revealed 
to be insufficient as the only strategy to assure women access to a full citizenship 
in as much it does not confront the structural unbalance of  power between sexes 
that allows the subordination of  women in society. The most successful scenario 
that could be reached by the implementation of  public policies based solely on this 
theoretical approach is a society where women are considered as men, which involves 
that, in order to accomplish full citizenship, they will be obligated to meet all the 
social requirements and standards designed based on the male role model. 
Once the deficits presented by this perspective were noted, during the so-called 
second wave of  feminism, a new current of  thought within feminism emerged, 
the feminism of  difference, that claims the worth of  all the attributes, behaviours 
and values that traditionally have been underrated as typically female features. 
From this approach, different biological characteristics by sexes do exist and, most 
important, they are significant enough in order to justify a society divided into binary 
gendered categories where women and men must be treated differently. However, 
this justification from difference feminism of  the existence of  biological differences 
between sexes does not imply a defense of  the patriarchal regime where attributes 
considered as female are hierarchically inferior to those presented as male, but 
claims for the value of  reproductive work, traditionally considered as a female task. 
According to Carol Gilligan,14 pioneer scholar in shedding light on the underrated 
worth of  the female care work, there are diverse ways to be in the world and the 
way ascribed to women is culturally undervalued in as much as it has always been 
compared to the male standards, as if  they were the neutral, causing a distorting 
situation. Thus, from difference feminism has been exalted the worth of  the female 
caregiving work, asking for public support and encouragement of  the reproductive 
work, defending a sort of  maternalism as opposed to policies that seek to achieve 
equality with men through measures that enable women access to paid employment. 
However, public strategies formulated under the difference approach run the risk 
of  also becoming measures of  what is good or bad for women, leading into an 
essentialist perspective that must be avoided. Indeed, promoting the essentialisation 
14 Carol Gilligan, La ética del cuidado (Barcelona: Fundaciò Víctor Gíifols i Lucas, 2013).
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of  caregiving work as female and, therefore, stimulating the allocation of  women 
to the domestic sphere, would end up enhancing women economic dependence on 
men.15
As Castro García has pointed out, an example of  this is what happened in 
France in the early 1990s when the crisis drove many women out of  the labour 
market and into their homes. In this context, a maternity allowance was approved for 
those mothers who stayed at home exclusively to care for their children during their 
first three years. The background of  the naturalist offensive was diluted by questions 
such as: is not raising and caring for children just another job? Is this not a way 
of  recognizing and socially valuing motherhood? However, from a non-essentialist 
position, it is possible to answer with other questions: how is it that only women 
seem to be qualified for care at home? Is it that the fact that men cannot beget makes 
them incapable of  caring for their children?.16
In short, while public policies underpinned by a conception of  equality entails 
treating women exactly like men, as equality feminism advocates, they have proved 
insufficient to guarantee the access of  women into full citizenship. The essentialist 
notions of  femininity argued from feminism of  difference run the risk of  justifying 
the implementation of  identity public policies that confine women within existing 
gender divisions perpetuating patriarchal gender stereotypes. As Albert Noguera17 
stated, there is only one delusion as great as trying to end with gender hierarchy 
only through equality feminism, and that is trying to end with it through difference 
feminism.  
Taking as a starting point these apparently opposite ways to address gender 
equality, Carole Pateman18 theorized the Wollstonecraft’s dilemma in reference to 
the incompatibility of  these alternative approaches that have generally been used 
simultaneously by the governments to design gender public policies. On the one 
hand, in line with the theoretical postulates of  feminism of  equality, women have 
demanded incorporation into the male citizenship, claiming for the recognition of  
the same rights and access to traditionally male-dominated spaces; on the other hand, 
women have also argued the existence of  specific characteristics, needs, concerns and 
skills that are different from those of  men and, consequently, a different model of  
citizenship from that designed in the image and likeness of  men has been claimed. In 
this sense, whether from the perspective of  feminism of  equality there is a demand 
to provide women with equal opportunities so that they are no longer confined to 
the domestic sphere and can access public space on equal terms with men, from 
the feminism of  difference what is being claimed is the specificity and value of  
typically female domestic and care tasks and their equalization in terms of  value to 
the productive work traditionally performed by men. According to Pateman, this is a 
dilemma because the two paths are incompatible since they are based on antagonistic 
theoretical assumptions, but also because neither of  the two paths proposed leads to 
the effective acquisition of  full citizenship by women. According to the author: “[the 
patriarchal understanding of  citizenship means that the two demands are incompatible because it 
15 Jane Lewis, “Gender and Welfare Regimes: Further Thoughts”, Social Politics: International Studies in 
Gender, State & Society, No. 4, vol. 2 (1997): 170.
16 Carmen Castro García, Modelos de bienestar, igualdad de género y permisos por nacimiento en un contexto de 
crisis del modelo social europeo (Doctoral Thesis, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2015), 64.
17 Albert Noguera, “Superar la división espacio-género en sentido constituyente”, in Feminismos y 
Procesos Constituyentes, ed. Adoración Guamán, (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2016),
18 Carole Pateman, “The Patriarchal Welfare State: Women and Democracy”.
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allows two alternatives only: either women become (like) men, and so full citizens; or they continue 
at women’ s work which is of  no value for citizenship. Moreover, within a patriarchal welfare state 
neither demand can be met. To demand that citizenship, as it presently exists, be extended to women, 
accepts the patriarchal meaning of  «citizen», which is constructed from men’ s attributes, capacities 
and activities. Women cannot be full citizens in the present meaning of  the term; at best, citizenship 
can be extended to women only as lesser men. At the same time, within the patriarchal welfare state, 
to demand proper social recognition and support for women’ s responsibilities is to condemn women 
to less than full citizenship, and continued incorporation into public life as «women», i.e., members 
of  another sphere who cannot, therefore, earn the respect of  fellow (i.e., male) citizens”.19
Furthermore, the author considers that the simultaneous articulation of  
measures responding to each of  the contradictory paradigms is the factor that 
could explain the constant advances and setbacks in equality. Thus, it would be the 
approach to gender public policies based on apparently contradictory interpretative 
frameworks that result in the articulation of  measures that are inconsistent with each 
other.
In the midst of  the debate between equality and difference, Nancy Fraser20 
points out that there are two models towards which public policies on gender equality 
could seek to advance, depending on whether they are based on the interpretative 
framework of  feminism of  equality or feminism of  difference: “the universal breadwinner 
model” and “the caregiver parity model”. The first of  these models, which is based on the 
postulates of  the inclusion of  women in the male citizenship model, seeks to achieve 
gender equality through the incorporation of  women into the public sphere. This 
objective is pursued by the public authorities through the promotion of  women’s 
employment and the provision of  public services that alleviate the care burdens 
that women bear and enable them to participate in the market on an equal footing 
with men. On the other hand, what Fraser calls “caregiver parity model”, based on the 
postulates of  difference feminism, seeks the promotion of  equality through the public 
promotion of  informal care work performed by women. The predominant systems 
of  public policy for gender equality in Europe have been an uneven combination of  
the two models described by Fraser, in a sort of  “equality within difference”21 that have 
included mutually contradictory policies that sought to promote the incorporation 
of  women into the labour market while keeping domestic and care responsibilities 
under their responsibility.
On the other hand, the implementation of  public policies in accordance with 
the guidelines set by either the two approaches in conflict within the Wollstonecraft 
dilemma offers only two alternatives: (1) either be like men and act like them or (2) 
continue to be women and keep on performing the tasks traditionally assigned to 
them.22 In this regard, according to Fraser, when designing public policies of  gender 
equality, the dichotomy between equality feminism and difference feminism posed 
by the Wollstonecraft dilemma must be broken: “This means breaking with the assumption 
that gender equity can be identified with any single value or norm, whether it be equality, difference, 
or something else. Instead we should treat it as a complex notion comprising a plurality of  distinct 
19 Carole Pateman, “The Patriarchal Welfare State: Women and Democracy”, 30.
20 Nancy Fraser, “After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State”, Political Theory, vol. 
22, No. 4 (1994): 591-618.
21 Castro García, Modelos de bienestar, igualdad de género, 407.
22 Octavio Salazar Benítez, “Educación diferenciada por razón de sexo y derecho a la educación. Sobre 
la inconstitucionalidad de la reforma del art.º 84.3 de la Ley Orgánica de Educación”, Revista Española 
de Derecho Constitucional, No. 106 (2016): 451-478.
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normative principles. The plurality will include some notions associated with the equality side of  the 
debate, as well as some associated with the difference side”.23
4. Nancy Fraser’s gender justice theory
Fraser24 also makes a contribution, trying to break with the false Wollstonecraft 
dilemma by proposing a complex theory of  gender justice integrated by several 
complementary faces that aim to reconcile the social equality of  all women with the 
cultural recognition of  the differences existing between women.
In her diagnosis, the philosopher proposes various dimensions that equality policies 
must address in order to be truly emancipatory. According to Fraser, it is important to 
first make a proper diagnosis of  the causes of  the situation of  subordination experienced 
by women, which include two dimensions: differences in access to resources – which 
would entail a problem of  (re)distribution of  material goods – and the hierarchisation 
of  cultural values – which would be a matter of  recognition. Any approach to gender 
equity by public powers that focuses only in one of  these dimensions of  women’s 
subordination, without articulating complementary measures that influence over the 
aspects of  the reality that are affected by the other, would be insufficient to eliminate 
the discrimination suffered by women and to achieve what Fraser calls “gender justice”.
However, according to Fraser, the most common approach to the issue of  
social injustice is made only from one of  the paradigms, dissociating the two types 
of  claims for justice to the point that, in many occasions, they come to be defined 
as opposite options. Thus, redistribution policies would be identified with socio-
economic transformations that identify unequal access to resources for women and 
men as a real problem. They would be centered on overcoming the sexual division 
of  labour and would seek to reformulate the relational logics of  public and private 
spheres, breaking the (no longer so) strict gendered division of  spaces. This would 
include a heterogeneous group of  measures, aimed at families and the labour market, 
ranging from the provision of  public care services to direct money transfers, including 
parental leave, incentives for women’s employment and other reconciliation measures.25
In turn, from the perspective of  recognition, the cultural aspects of  gender 
subordination which are expressed through the assignment to women of  a differentiated 
and hierarchically inferior status that privileges all the values, features and attitudes 
culturally associated with the males, while devaluing everything that constitutes the female 
role are addressed. This value hierarchy has a strong influence in the institutionalised 
configuration of  all spheres of  society. Thus, those measures that seek to deconstruct 
gender based on the re-signification of  cultural values and symbolic concepts that 
define public space as masculine and give tasks and characteristically associated with 
the feminine a secondary and denigrated role, would be identified as public policies of  
recognition. The cultural norms with which these policies engage in critical dialogue 
are those that determine the patriarchal social models of  representation, interpretation 
and communication and which are manifested behaviors such as sexual harassment 
and abuse, gender violence, the objectification of  women through different cultural 
narratives, the undervaluing of  women’s opinion, the exclusion of  women from 
spheres of  power, etc.
23 Fraser, “After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State”, 595.
24 Nancy Fraser, “Redistribución y reconocimiento: Hacia una visión integrada de justicia del género”, 
Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política, No. 8 (1996): 18-40.
25 Castro García, Modelos de bienestar, igualdad de género.
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Based on this diagnosis of  the situation of  women, Fraser argues that, in order 
to ensure gender justice, public powers must articulate redistribution policies and 
recognition policies integrated in a bivalent strategy, since gender inequality also has a 
bivalent content.
Indeed, gender constitutes a “basic structuring principle of  the political economy” since it 
structures both the sexual division between paid productive work and free reproductive 
work and, within the labour market, the division between prototypical male and female 
occupations. From this point of  view, the elimination of  women’s subordination 
requires a restructuring of  distributive justice that eliminates the sexual division of  
labour. At the same time, gender also constitutes a differentiation in terms of  status 
that society articulates around androcentrism or “authoritarian construction of  norms that 
privilege features associated with male” and devalues everything associated with the feminine. 
In this regard, Fraser argues that this is a devaluation that is institutionalised and that 
is manifested by means of  injustices of  recognition relatively independent of  political 
economy, which, therefore, require remedies of  recognition that are additional and 
independent from redistribution.
As Fraser stated: “[i]t is increasingly common that policies of  redistribution and recognition 
are presented mutually exclusive alternatives”. Defenders of  the former insist that identity 
politics is a counterproductive deviation from economic issues of  real interest, 
balkanizing groups and rejecting the universalist norms that are the basis of  social 
equality. Indeed, the claim that it is ‘the economy, you idiot’. Conversely, advocates of  the 
policy of  recognition insist that a policy of  redistribution that is blind to differences can 
reinforce injustice, as it falsely universalizes the norms of  dominant groups by requiring 
subordinate groups to assimilate them and failing to recognize their distinctiveness. It 
may be understood that what is claimed from this point of  view is ‘culture, you idiot’. 
These attacks and counterattacks seem to present a choice between two mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Which of  these two policies should we choose?”.26
Redistribution policies would affect the political-economic structure and require 
measures aimed at reorganizing the division of  labour and redistributing income, among 
other things, in such a way as to ensure women’s independence and access to resources. 
Recognition policies would be those that seek to revalue socially denigrated identities 
through changes in institutionalised valuation patterns. In this sense, the bivalent 
concept of  justice, which integrates the dimensions of  redistribution and recognition 
referred to by Fraser, is embodied in the concept of  participatory parity. According to this 
notion, justice requires addressing changes in society in such a way that all the members 
of  society are allowed to interact with each other as equals. In Fraser’s view, for this 
participatory parity to be possible, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish basic 
rules of  formal legal equality. Furthermore, two additional requirements must be met: 
the objective precondition of  participatory parity, which would be identified with the 
distribution of  material resources in such a way as to ensure the independence and “voice” 
of  all participants; and what she calls an intersubjective precondition for participatory 
parity, which she identifies with the establishment of  cultural models of  interpretation 
and appreciation that express mutual respect and ensure equal opportunities to achieve 
social esteem. For Fraser, “both the objective precondition and the intersubjective precondition are 
necessary conditions for participatory parity; neither is sufficient in itself”.27
26 Fraser, “Redistribución y reconocimiento: Hacia una visión integrada de justicia del género”, 23.
27 Fraser, “Redistribución y reconocimiento: Hacia una visión integrada de justicia del género”, 33.
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At a later stage, following the formulation of  her theory of  bivalent justice, 
Fraser28 incorporates a third dimension which, although already mentioned in 
previous essays, had not yet been fully integrated into the whole of  her theory: it 
is the political representation, condition to which from this moment on, she gives 
equivalent importance to the dimensions of  redistribution and recognition, going 
on from a “perspectivist dualism” to a “triad of  key concepts”.29 Fraser considers 
that if  there is no equal participation in the three dimensions (economic, symbolic 
and political) there cannot be true gender justice. When addressing this third 
dimension of  the theory of  parity justice, Fraser begins by criticizing Habermas’s 
conceptualisation of  the public sphere, pointing out that the model of  public 
space idealised by the philosopher is based on a liberal conception that relies on 
certain significant exclusions, whose fundamental axis is gender exclusion. In this 
sense, Fraser asserts that is necessary to demand the participation of  women in 
the masculinised sphere from which they have traditionally been excluded, but in a 
complementary manner to the demand for public policies that fight injustice from 
the perspectives of  redistribution and recognition, because not only the what  and 
the how of  public policies are relevant, but also the who, in reference to the political 
arena as the field where the content of  redistribution and recognition measures are 
decided. Thus, Fraser considers that it is necessary to incorporate public policies 
aimed at removing the obstacles that prevent women’s equal participation in politics 
as a way of  addressing the injustices that occur both in the economy and in the 
symbolic spheres. In this way, Nancy Fraser’s theory of  parity is made up of  three 
complementary pillars: redistribution in economic sphere, recognition in the area of  
identity and representation in the political sphere.
5. Gender-transformative potential of  public policies
The relevant question related to public policies at this point would be: to what 
extent do the action of  public powers influence reality to modify gender inequality 
and alter the behavioral patterns that underlie subordination? According to Helga 
Hernes,30 it cannot be said that the major changes in the situation of  women in 
recent decades have been the result of  public policy. For the Norwegian political 
scientist, Nation States  regulate the changes that are already happening in society. 
Similarly, Astelarra31 argues that a change in gender structures requires people to 
radically modify their ideas, modes of  action and values with respect to gender and 
that such a “revolution” is not possible only through the implementation of  public 
policies. However, both scholars agree that public policies, if  properly targeted, 
are key to setting the direction and speed of  social change in this regard. Thus, in 
the same way that for years they have contributed to the reproduction of  a certain 
unequal gender roles, public policies can constitute an adequate tool to promote 
the transformation of  those roles, but their effectiveness will depend on the way in 
which gender inequality is addressed. Following the scheme already analysed that was 
proposed by Nancy Fraser, public policies should be aimed at eradicating the sexual 
28 Nancy Fraser, “Repensando la esfera pública: una contribución a la crítica de la democracia 
actualmente existente”, Ecuador Debate (1999): 139-174.
29 Clara Iglesias, “Justicia como redistribución, reconocimiento y representación: Las reconciliaciones 
de Nancy Fraser”, Investigaciones Feministas, No. 3 (2012): 256.
30 Hernes, El poder de las mujeres y el Estado del bienestar, 31.
31 Astelarra, Veinte años de políticas de igualdad, 93.
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division of  labour in the material order and androcentrism in the cultural order. 
In this sense, several scholars propose different classifications of  public policies 
according to various criteria based on this perspective. 
As early as 1985, within a research about the role of  women in the Sandinista 
Revolution in Nicaragua, Marine Molyneaux distinguished between practical gender 
interest and strategic gender interest.32 According to Molyneux, the former contributed 
to the improvement of  women’s situation, but is not ultimately oriented towards 
the destabilisation of  gender hierarchy, i.e., of  socially imposed behavioural models 
for women and men. In contrast, the defense of  strategic gender interests would 
integrate those actions that do aspire to the deconstruction of  some aspects of  the 
unequal distribution of  power that is at the base of  women’s subordination.
Blanca Rodríguez33 takes as main criterion the model of  citizenship promoted 
by the measures contained in the Equality Acts in order to classify them according 
to whether they expand women’s rights without questioning the classic model of  
exclusionary citizenship, or whether, on the contrary, the engage in a critical dialogue 
with the classic model of  citizenship, promoting relational paradigms orchestrated 
around truly equal and inclusive parameters that overcome the ones built on the 
hidden sexual contract that subordinates women.
Similarly, Encarna Bodelón34 classifies the different kind of  solutions to the 
unequal situation experience by women among those that propose “the incorporation of  
women into the traditional model of  citizenship”, versus those that call for “the reconceptualization 
of  women’s citizenship, so as to build a universal and diverse model of  citizenship”.
In the same vein, Judith Squires35 has distinguished three categories in the ways 
of  female participation in the State: the addition of  women to the public sphere 
without altering the male norms that govern this space; the incorporation of  women 
into public space by extending its boundaries, i.e., also accommodating specifically 
female interests and needs through the creation of  gender institutions; and, finally, 
the reconceptualisation of  public sphere itself, seeking to eliminate the androcentrism 
from the social structure by making the underlying gender structures visible.
More specifically, Carmen Castro36 has classified public policies according to 
their gender-transformative potential on three levels: (1) measures that reinforce 
gender stereotypes, extolling sexual differentiation as well as promoting the role of  
women as mothers and caregivers, which would have a negative gender-transformative 
potential; (2) measures that apparently seem neutral but that contribute to the 
perpetuation of  gender inequalities by not questioning  gender hierarchy, which 
would have a neutral gender-transformative-potential; and, finally, those measures 
that “actively promote a change in gender patterns” to which Castro associates a positive 
gender-transformative potential.
On the basis of  all the above, we consider that a decisive criterion for the 
classification of  a given system of  gender equality public policies would be the 
degree of  transformative gender potential of  the measures it contains, depending 
32 Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and 
Revolution in Nicaragua”, Feminist Studies, No. 2, vol. 11 (1985): 227-254.
33 Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz, “Hacia un estado post-patriarcal. Feminismo y ciudadanía”, Revista de 
Estudios Politicos, No. 149 (2010): 87-122.
34 Encarna Bodelón, “Las leyes de igualdad de género en España y Europa: ¿Hacia una nueva 
ciudadanía?”, Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, No. 26 (2010): 85–106.
35 Judith Squires, The New Politics of  Gender Equality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
36 Castro García, Modelos de bienestar, igualdad de género.
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on whether they are (1) public policies that expand women’s rights, improving their 
living conditions but without questioning the power relations that are at the base of  
subordination, that is, without questioning either the sexual division of  labour or 
androcentrism, or (2) public policies that ultimately aim to dismantle the unequal 
regime of  gender relations and to break the space-gender division by attacking the 
unequal behavioral patterns that are at the base of  subordination.
6. Strategy of  intervention
As for the effective articulation of  strategies to approach gender equality, these 
have been adopting different forms over the time. Thus, if  in the origin of  human 
communities, inequality was at the base of  the political organization of  societies, with 
the Enlightenment and the development of  the modern State, the equality of  rights 
between men will become the structuring principle of  all societies, an equality which, 
on other side of  the coin was given by the inferiority, attributed both symbolically and 
formally, to women. In this way, the legal systems were articulated as consubstantial 
to this unequal relationship, enshrining de iure male superiority. This regime is going 
to be discarded because of  the  women’s struggle for access to civil and political 
rights, which will bring about formal recognition of  women’s equality. Initially, 
gender equality is identified with formal equality and the strategies for incorporating 
women into citizenship are limited to the mere recognition of  formal rights on equal 
terms with men, seeking to outlaw discrimination based on sex and to ensure equal 
opportunities. However, once the insufficiency of  this formalist approach was noted, 
public powers move on to address gender equality from a material perspective that 
implies a qualitative leap in the way equality is understood, from the prohibition 
of  discrimination to effective equality, which implies not only the preterition of  
unfavorable treatments based on sex, but also “guaranteeing conditions so that treatment 
and opportunities are equal for both sexes”.37 Thus, the recognition of  effective equality 
between women and men necessarily implies the recognition of  a series of  obligations 
to or addressed to the State – obligations that have been made concrete through 
different strategies, namely, positive action and gender mainstreaming.
Public policies for equal opportunities are based on the liberal conception of  
equality supported by the theoretical postulates of  equality feminism. According to 
this conception, public policies must be oriented towards ensuring that all citizens 
have equal opportunities of  access to the different spaces and rights. Once the State 
has ensured this equality of  opportunities, any difference that may arise between 
individuals can only be an issue of  merit and ability, individually considered. In 
the case of  women, equality opportunity has been oriented eminently towards 
facilitating their access to the public sphere –mainly to the labour market– under 
equal conditions with men. Thus, the strategies for achieving this objective have 
focused on the elimination of  “legal, economic, social, cultural and power barriers”38 that 
prevented or hindered such access. In this sense, one of  the central elements of  the 
policies of  equality of  opportunities has been the education measures, that tend to 
guarantee similar formative levels for women and men.
Nevertheless, despite the generalisation of  equal opportunity policies, reality 
has shown that it has not been possible to achieve the objective of  incorporating 
37 Asunción Ventura Franch and Santiago García Campá, El Derecho a la Igualdad Efectiva de Mujeres y 
Hombres. Una evaluación del primer decenio de la Ley Orgánica 3/2007 (Pamplona: Aranzadi, 2018), 57.
38 Astelarra, Veinte años de políticas de igualdad, 75.
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women into the public sphere on equal terms with men only through this kind of  
public strategy, since there are other aspects of  social life that are not susceptible 
to be modified through this type of  legislative changes, which do not address the 
structural causes that lie at the root of  women’s subordination. Thus, for example, 
cultural prejudices still exist in the labour market against hiring women despite the 
fact that education policies have resulted in on women catching up with men’s level 
of  education. At the same time, equal opportunities do not address the fact that 
women continue assuming main responsibility for domestic and care work in the 
private sphere.
In light of  the limitations of  public policies for equal opportunities in obtaining 
the effective result of  parity participation in the public sphere, it has been proposed 
that public policies  be designed to correct the structural inequalities that exist between 
women and men at the starting point. In this context, affirmative action measures 
began to be articulated. This public policies consider the existence of  original 
situations of  subordination that prevent or hinder the participation in society under 
equal conditions of  certain collectives. Thus, affirmative action policies address the 
issue of  the deficient participation of  women in the public sphere from a re-balancing 
perspective that takes into account the initial disadvantage experienced by women as 
a result of  the patriarchal system and seeks to correct it in order to guarantee greater 
quotas of  power for women in public sphere.
Nonetheless, despite the progress made in improving the conditions for women’s 
participation in the public sphere thanks to the implementation of  affirmative action 
measures, the truth is that these have not been enough either to eliminate the multiple 
situations of  discrimination suffered by women. The main limitation of  affirmative 
action measures in the way they have been implemented derives from the fact that, 
although they seek to remove the structural obstacles that are at the root of  women’s 
deficient participation in the public sphere, they do not get to transform the cultural 
rules that attribute to women the responsibilities of  the domestic sphere. 
In contrast to that, the concept gender mainstreaming would refer to a form of  
approach to gender equality by the governments that involves the full incorporation 
of  the gender perspective into all public policies, at all institutional levels and at all 
stages of  the public policy cycle. This approach to gender equality seeks to have an 
impact through public policies in all spheres of  people’s lives. However, the fact is that 
the most widespread definition of  the notion of  gender mainstreaming has generally 
given priority to procedural aspects, referring to the bureaucratic-institutional 
mechanism used to incorporate the gender perspective into public policies. Despite 
that, there has also been a call for an extensive conception of  gender mainstreaming 
which includes not only a mode of  policy making, but also substantive aspects 
relating to a new way of  understanding equality and of  articulating the objectives of  
the political agenda in the interest of  women’s participation in society.39 
In this regard, as Astelarra points out, “these new forms of  intervention may have two 
different, albeit complementary, strategies. They can be addressed and applied in the logic of  equal 
opportunities and positive action or they can begin to propose a new strategy that refers to the need 
for structural reforms of  the gender system”.40 In this sense, gender mainstreaming would 
also imply that all public decisions must be assessed from the point of  view of  
39 Vid. Emanuela Lombardo, “Integrating or setting the agenda? Gender mainstreaming in the 
european constitution-making process”, Social Politics, No. 12, vol. 3 (2005): 412–432.
40 Astelarra, Veinte años de políticas de igualdad.
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their consequences for women, taking into account not only the initial disadvantaged 
position in which they find themselves but also the structural causes that cause  this 
inequality. These causes are deeply rooted in all areas of  society and, if  they are not 
considered and analysed carefully, will even be reproduced by the same institutions 
and organizations used in the fight for gender equality. Indeed, it is common for public 
policies –including public policies of  gender equality– to be designed not considering 
these structural causes and including cultural gender assumption about the figure of  
women as mothers and caregivers, which leads to perpetuate the identification of  
women with this subordinate role. In this regard, when diagnosing the problem and 
designing public policies, public powers must make an approach to gender inequality 
that comprises not only the multiple manifestations of  discrimination experienced 
by women –such as gender violence, the wage gap or the feminisation of  poverty– 
but also, and fundamentally, they have to take into consideration the ultimate causes 
of  the inequality that exists in our society. In so doing, it is necessary that public 
policies diagnose and confront the historically unequal power relations existing 
between women and men and connect them to the situations of  discrimination, 
since the latter are just the outcome of  the formers. As Espinosa Fajardo points out, 
“in this framework, systematic attention to the structural causes that explain the specific models of  
gender relations in each given context is a very important element in promoting equality”.41
7. Legal enforceability
Finally, although it may seem an ancillary issue, it is of  paramount importance 
to take into consideration the degree of  enforceability presented by gender equality 
policies in order to determine their effectiveness in achieving their objective. Indeed, 
it is common that many of  the equality measures and public policies that are legally 
articulated, afterwards are not implemented or are implemented in a deficient 
manner. Moreover, if  we put in relation the criteria developed above with the degree 
of  enforceability of  the equality measures, it is revealed as a common trend that the 
more gender transformative power they have, the lower the degree of  enforceability 
they present and, thus, the more chance of  non-compliance. This lack of  observance 
or relaxation of  compliance with the rules that seek to influence social reality in 
order to eradicate gender inequality has its origins in various reasons that are closely 
related to the legislative techniques used to articulate the measures designed in order 
to achieve effective equality. 
Taking as an illustrative example the Gender Equality Act passed in Spain in 
200742 we could point out up to four factors that erode the binding nature of  the 
precepts contained in this Act, namely (1) the heterogeneity of  its precepts, coexisting 
hard law mandatory rules with soft law ones; (2) the lack of  normative concreteness 
in the drafting of  many of  the precepts; (3) the deficient enforcement measures 
against the non-compliance of  the hard law precepts, as well as the absence of  
41 Rosa Espinosa Fajardo, Guía de género para políticas públicas más transformadoras (Oxfam Intermón, 
2018), 16.
42 In Spain, equality public policies have been articulated at the state level since the creation of  the first 
institutional body for this purpose, the Women’s Institute, in 1983, recently restored to democracy 
after the Franco dictatorship that lasted almost forty years. Since then, several measures have been 
developed in pursuit of  gender equality, but undoubtedly the most relevant, as it is a true code of  
equality, has been the Organic Law for Effective Equality between Women and Men, approved in 
2007 and which contains a heterogeneous group of  measures affecting all public authorities and 
society in general with the aim of  achieving a more egalitarian society.
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mechanism that allow reacting to the omissions of  the subjects to whom the measures 
are addressed; (4) the absence of  a specific penalty system against possible violations.
The Spanish Equality Act, conceived as an “Equality Code”, incorporates a 
catalogue of  very diverse measures that affect the complex regulation of  very different 
areas, presenting “a technical and structural complexity derived from its ambitious aim”43. This 
is a factor that directly affects the social perception of  these measures as mere norms 
defining reality, which incorporate provisions of  a non-binding nature and, therefore, 
of  more voluntary than mandatory adhesion. 
In fact, a good part of  the 78 articles of  the Spanish Equality Act includes general 
principles, conceptual definitions, recommendations and noncompulsory mandates to 
public institutions and private agents which do not take away its value as an instrument 
of  symbolic redefinition of  reality or as a criterion for the interpretation of  other 
norms, but that makes, in practice, the concrete obligations of  duty become diluted 
between general declarations and principles that lack compulsiveness and effectiveness. 
In this sense, Rubio Castro points out how the Spanish Equality Act is a norm of  
imperative law or hard law in which provisions of  hard law coexist with provisions of  
soft law, this is, with norms “[...] whose purpose is to propose, not to impose certain behaviors or 
practices; this is, a rule that tries to seek, given the nature of  its purpose, the voluntary adhesion of  the 
different normative subjects to whom it is addressed”.44 In fact, the approach to gender equality 
from a norm, covering all spheres of  life, can be very difficult –when not impossible– 
through stablishing only mandatory behaviours. In this sense, the lack of  precision 
and the generality of  norms and principles can be perceived as legislative techniques 
that seek to modify behavioural patterns where compulsory regulation is not viable. 
Therefore, at first, the mere fact of  including in the legislation of  equality precepts that 
gather norms that intend to promote a certain behaviour not from the imperative, but 
from the voluntary adhesion of  the actors involved, should not imply itself  a problem 
in as much as the circumstances that give rise to the use of  this legislative technique, as 
well as the objectives that are intended to be reached with it, differ from the context in 
which the traditional legislative techniques would be applied. Thus, for example, while 
in the interdiction of  discrimination based on sex in the labour market is required a 
formal approach that makes it possible to articulate clear mechanisms for prohibiting 
and sanctioning non-compliance, with regard to the promotion of  effective equality 
between private actors, the different nature of  this kind of  relationship justify the 
legislator’s commitment to a different strategy, more focused on obtaining the voluntary 
support of  the agents involved on the basis of  their own spontaneous commitment 
or, in any case, using persuasion rather than explicit compulsory mechanisms. In 
this sense, for example, Articles 50 and 74 of  the Spanish Equality Act urge private 
companies to undertake actions of  social responsibility aimed at promoting conditions 
of  equality between women and men, presenting as an incentive to do so the possibility 
of  publicizing them in order to gain a better public social image. The aim of  this type 
of  precept is to encourage companies to take action to promote equality, not by means 
of  direct coercion, but by offering them benefits derived from developing such action, 
such as projecting a more favourable social image, but always leaving the effective 
implementation of  such measures to the decision of  the companies.
 
43 Ana Rubio Castro, “Los efectos jurídicos del soft law en materia de igualdad efectiva. La experiencia 
española”, AFD (XXX), (2014): 54.
44 Rubio Castro, “Los efectos jurídicos del soft law en materia de igualdad efectiva”, 50.
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However, although agreeing with Rubio Castro on the suitability of  this type 
of  soft law measures for certain cases in which classic regulations would not be 
effective in achieving the objectives set out, the truth is that the generalisation of  the 
legislative technique of  soft law draws a panorama in which compliance with a large 
part –if  not the majority– of  the normative precepts contained in equality laws ends 
up being left to the will of  the different social agents involved in   implementing 
many of  the measures that seem only suggested, thus losing the great transformative 
potential that could have been achieved by setting a clear obligation. 
In this sense, the problem emerges when we see how soft law technique has 
been chosen not only when the nature of  the mandate or the sector to which it is 
addressed so requires, but also in cases where circumstances would have allowed a 
more restrictive regulatory structure to be chosen without problem, including clearly 
mandatory rules. Thus, for example, it is not understood that a large part of  the 
mandates addressed to the various bodies of  the public administration are stated in 
terms such as “may”, “shall”, etc., in such a way that it ends up leaving the effective 
implementation of  measures that could have been categorically articulated in a classic 
normative sense to the discretion of  the political will, in cases where the imperative 
wouldn’t have necessarily reduced the effectiveness of  the provisions, but rather the 
opposite. This legislative technique can be found in numerous precepts addressed to 
public authorities throughout the Equality Act, such as its Article 33, which establishes 
that Public Administrations may establish special conditions in the execution of  their 
contracts in order to promote equality between men and women. In this regard, 
the indiscriminate use of  terms that convey a diffuse obligation, such as “may” or 
“shall”, makes it difficult to verify effective compliance with the provisions of  the 
rule when the precepts do not require either a specific result or specific behaviour on 
the part of  those to whom the rule is addressed. Finally, this wide presence of  soft 
law precepts has “contaminated” the norms of  hard law contained in the Equality 
Law to the point that it has been generalised the perception that its norms are just of  
voluntary adhesion for the social actors to whom it is directed. 
With respect to those precepts that do contemplate a concrete obligation to 
make addressed to public powers, the normative meaning of  the terms in which the 
precept is expressed and the lack of  legal provision of  mechanisms to be activated 
against the non-compliance of  the prescribed obligations are factors that also 
contribute to transmitting the perception that the Act does not bind its recipients 
beyond what those, in each concrete moment, are willing to assume. In effect, the 
Spanish Equality Act does not contain a regime of  infractions and sanctions to oppose 
against the breach of  most of  its provisions and, beyond the reference for certain 
provisions to what is established in the sanctioning regimes of  other disciplines, 
it remains in the field of  normative stasis. In this sense, for example, Article 26 
states that the public administration bodies responsible for cultural management 
shall adopt measures to encourage the specific promotion of  women in culture with 
regard to artistic production. However, it does not establish how often or what type 
of  measures, nor does it provide for any legal consequences in case that these bodies, 
which are also not listed, do not comply with this provision.45 In this type of  precept, 
45 In order to propose solutions to alleviate this situation, in the year 2000, the OECD prepared a report 
on regulatory management in relation to compliance with legislative provisions in our country, in which 
it proposed the creation of  a specialized unit to clearly establish the principles of  responsibility and the 
frameworks for their implementation. The recommendations made by that authority would be addressed 
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a mandate is established in which the obligation to do is not such, insofar as it is 
specified through diffuse verbal forms which are difficult to identify with specific 
obligations to make, such as they will encourage, procure, ensure, etc. 
Similarly, many precepts include a specific mandate to do or not to do 
something, in terms of  duty, to the public authorities, but no legal consequences 
are established against the omission of  the obligations legally established. There is 
no mechanism in the legal system to react to the normative inactivity of  the public 
authorities, beyond the possible questioning of  the validity of  the act in application 
of  the procedural rules applicable to each case, nor does it ensure that the judges 
intervene by obliging the other public authorities to amend the omission committed. 
For example, Article 19 of  the Equality Act provides that all draft general provisions 
approved by the Government must be accompanied by a mandatory gender impact 
assessment report. This is undoubtedly a crucial gender mainstreaming measure 
based on the premise that public policies, even if  apparently neutral, implemented 
in a society marked by the unequal distribution of  power between women and men 
have a differentiated gender impact. This is a genuine gender mainstreaming tool 
that aims at reconfiguring all policy making at the highest level, forcing reflection 
on the unequal gender impact of  all public policies; a measure, therefore, with a 
high gender transformative potential. Nevertheless, the effective elaboration of  the 
gender impact report has presented certain deficiencies in its implementation, mainly 
derived from the fact that the normative disposition does not specify extremes 
such as what should be the minimum content of  the reports and from the lack of  
available data to analyze the gender impact, which results in a low quality of  them.46 
On the other hand, with regard to the jurisdictional control of  compliance with the 
provisions of  the equality laws, it has also proved ineffective in ensuring that the 
subjects to whom the obligations contained in the regulatory precepts are addressed 
are effectively bound, even when they are hard law rules. In this sense, as Gil Ruiz47 
has shown, the judges do not consider as a nullity defect the noncompliance or 
defective compliance with the obligation to prepare gender impact reports.
All of  the above results into the transfer to the public authorities, as main 
recipients of  the mandates, of  the perception that the effective implementation of  
the precepts contained in the Equality Act depends on their own initiative, which can 
easily be replaced by the need to attend to other political issues that may arise.
It is also usual that it is precisely those measures that present a greater transformative 
potential that suffer from a greater lack of  enforceability, to the point of  being legally 
articulated through precepts that suggest a voluntary behaviour without incorporating 
any element of  coercion or persuasion. For example: Article 22 of  the Spanish Equality 
Act provides that local governments may establish municipal plans for organizing the 
city’s time. The rationale of  this precept is that the lack of  coordination between the 
city’s timetables and the needs of  the citizens affects mainly women, since they are the 
to the Council of  Ministers and it would be empowered to coordinate the entire administration in 
relation to regulatory policies, as well as to review the protocols for evaluating existing public policies. 
This project, however, has not been implemented in the terms proposed in the aforementioned report, 
although the recommendations made have not lost their validity at present and the shortcomings 
detected in the Spanish system of  public policy implementation continue to be a problem.
46 Eva Alfama y Alba Alonso, “Las políticas de género en la administración pública. Una introducción”, 
Revista Vasca de Gestión de Personas y Organizaciones Públicas, No. 8 (2015): 30.
47 Juana M. Gil Ruiz, Las nuevas técnicas legislativas en España. Informes de Evaluación de Impacto de Género 
(Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012).
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ones who assume the task of  combining the responsibilities of  the public and private 
spheres in a more intense way. It is not surprising, therefore, as Lousada Arochena 
points out “that initiatives to rationalize city time come hand in hand with laws on equality between 
women and men in the context of  policies to reconcile personal, family and working life”.48 According 
to the Nancy Fraser classification, we would be facing a public policy of  redistribution 
since its objective is to rebalance access to resources. As for the approach strategy, 
we would be facing a gender mainstreaming measure, and from the perspective of  its 
gender-transformative potential, it would be a measure that questions the prevailing 
model of  citizenship and aims to subvert the relational logics of  public and private 
spaces. In this sense, the possibility of  reorganizing the times and logics of  public and 
private spaces goes beyond mere individual reconciliation policies and assumes, in a 
global manner, that there are difficulties in making the public and domestic spheres 
compatible, derived from the chronological and chronometric demands of  each of  
them. Thus, ultimately, this measure contributes to subverting the space-gender divide 
that underlies the patriarchal and discriminatory model of  society.
However, the language used in the aforementioned Article 22 is characterised by 
the vague, imprecise terms and, above all, non-compulsory, which it uses, dispensing 
with any element of  coercion that obliges the Local government to implement such 
plans. In short, the terms used in the final wording of  Article 22 mean that it is 
considered more of  a programmatic precept, whose effective implementation is not 
required but rather conditioned by political opportunity criteria49 without there being 
any measures on the part of  the Nation State to encourage its adoption. Thus, with 
a few isolated exceptions, the provisions of  Article 22 has not had a generalised 
application in Spain and the plans for the use of  time, despite the enormous 
potential for modifying the differentiated and incompatible relational logics of  the 
public-private spaces they present, have for the moment remained in the field of  
the anecdotal in favour of  other types of  public policies to which greater political 
priority has been given.
8. Criteria for the analysis of  a gender policies public regime
In short, the relationship between women and the Nation State is controversial. 
Traditionally, the Nation State has played a significant role in maintaining the 
patriarchal social order that sustains the situation of  gender inequality, but at the 
same time, the potential presented by the State to correct the situation of  gender 
inequality through its public policies is undeniable. This depends, in any case, on 
what is understood by equality, a decisive notion when it comes to determining the 
objectives to be pursued by public policies, the mechanisms to be articulated in so 
doing and the areas of  reality on which these should have an impact.  For decades, 
it has been common to identify the notion of  equality with a single concept or 
value, labeling others as opposed and incompatible, which has sometimes led to a 
dead end in the search for equality through public policies. In this regard, Nancy 
Fraser proposes a polyvalent theory of  gender justice, which identifies the notion of  
equality with action on at least three areas of  reality that must be covered by public 
48 José Fernando Lousada Arochena, El principio de igualdad de mujeres y hombres: en especial, en el derecho del 
trabajo y de la seguridad social (Doctoral Thesis, Universidad de Coruña, 2013), 331.
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policy: (a) redistribution in the economic sphere; (b) recognition in the symbolic 
sphere; and (c) representation in the political sphere.
Once the areas of  action on which public equality policies must simultaneously 
have an impact in order to be effective have been determined, a fundamental 
question when it comes to determining whether or not a given set of  public policies 
is favourable to the emancipation of  women is their potential to subvert the model 
of  exclusionary citizenship that is at the root of  subordination. In this sense, it 
must be taken into account whether they question the behavioural roles and unequal 
relational logics that underpin the entire patriarchal social order, or whether, on the 
contrary, they assume them as natural, maintaining  the division of  society into public 
and domestic sphere.
To conclude, it is also decisive, when judging the effectiveness of  a certain 
system of  public policies, to analyse the legislative techniques used to articulate the 
different measures, paying special attention to the degree of  enforceability that they 
present. In this sense it is usually the case that those measures with the greatest 
transformative potential are precisely those that suffer from a greater lack of  
compulsion and that, therefore, are not effectively implemented.
According to all the above, we propose the use of  at least the following five 
criteria when analysing the gender-transformative potential of  gender equality public 
policies in a given territory: (a) That they cover the four facets proposed by Fraser, 
i.e., redistribution, recognition and representation; (b) Strategy of  intervention; (c) 
Degree of  legal enforceability; (d) Questioning of  the model of  citizenship; and (e) 
Redefinition of  the relational logics of  public and private spaces. 
